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Predictive processing accounts of neural function view the brain as a kind of 
prediction machine that forms models of its environment in order to anticipate the 
upcoming stream of sensory stimulation. These models are then continuously updated 
in light of incoming error signals. Predictive processing has offered a powerful new 
perspective on cognition, action, and perception. In this chapter we apply the insights 
from predictive processing to the study of emotions. The upshot is a picture of 




1. Predictive Processing and Emotion – The Story So Far 
 
Emotion and cognition are typically thought of in contrast to one another, 
sitting on opposite sides of a divide between passion and reason, the hot and the cold. 
But what does our best theory of the brain and central nervous system (CNS) tell us 
about the nature of emotion?  
According to an increasingly popular framework in computational 
neuroscience, the brain is a hierarchically arranged prediction machine (Clark 
(2013a)). Contrary to once-popular feedforward approaches, the brain does not simply 
take inputs from the outside world, process them, and pass them deeper and deeper 
into the processing economy. Instead, whenever information from the world impacts 
on your sensory surfaces, it is already, even at the earliest stages, greeted by a 
downward-flowing prediction on the part of your nervous system. This prediction 
comes from your brain’s best model of what is going on in the world, and this model 
is constantly being updated by the mistakes it makes, by the so-called ‘prediction 
error signal’, which it constantly tries to keep to a minimum (Lee and Mumford 
 
 
(2003), Rao and Ballard (1999)). In recent versions, this signal is weighted according 
to how reliable or salient the brain estimates the sensory information to be, relative to 
its best predictions. This ‘precision-weighting’ device operates at every level of 
processing. It implements attention, and allows us flexibly to balance top-down 
prediction and bottom-up sensory information (see Feldman and Friston (2010) and 
Clark (2013b)) 
The core business of brains like ours, if these stories are on track, is the 
minimization of precision-weighted errors in the prediction of sensory inputs (see 
Friston (2005) – and for comprehensive reviews, see Howhy (2013), Clark (2013a)). 
Importantly, the minimization of precision-weighted prediction error isn’t always 
achieved by the brain updating its models of the world (which results in perception 
and belief). Instead it is sometimes achieved by bringing the world, usually the body, 
in line with the model (Feldman and Friston (2010), Clark (2016) Chapter 4). The 
result of this is bodily action. 
According to early work in predictive processing (e.g Lee and Mumford 
(2003), Friston (2005)), what you perceptually experience is determined by the model 
that your brain adopts so as to best predict exteroceptive sensory signals such as 
incoming visual and auditory information. Building on this basic idea, it has recently 
been suggested (Seth (2013)) that what we emotionally experience is determined by 
the model that your brain adopts so as to best predict interoceptive signals – signals 
carrying information about the states of gut, viscera, hydration, vasomotor system, 
air-supply, muscular system, glucose and plasma levels, etc. 
Here, the predictive processing (PP) account adds important dimensions to the 
well-known James-Lange model of emotional states as arising from the perception of 
our own bodily responses to external stimuli and events. The idea there, in a nutshell, 
 
 
was that our emotional ‘feelings’ are nothing but the perceptions of our own varying 
physiological responses. According to James it is our interoceptive perception of the 
bodily changes characteristic of fear (sweating, trembling etc.) that constitutes the 
very feeling of fear, giving it its distinctive psychological flavor. From a subjective 
viewpoint, interoceptive awareness manifests as a differentiated array of feelings 
including those of ‘pain, temperature, itch, sensual touch, muscular and visceral 
sensations . . . hunger, thirst, and “air hunger”’ (Craig, 2003, p. 500). The feeling of 
fear, if James is right, is thus essentially the detection of an interoceptive 
physiological signature that has already been induced by exposure to the threatening 
situation.  
A popular (and useful) way to think about James’ proposal is to see it as 
suggesting a kind of ‘subtraction test’. This is a thought experiment in which you are 
invited to subtract all the bodily stuff (detection of your own racing heart etc.) away 
from the emotional experience, and ask yourself ‘what would be left?’.  James’ claim 
is that you would be left with nothing that is worth counting as an experience or 
emotion. What an emotion really is, James argument suggests, is the self-perception 
of changes in our own bodily states.  
But the standard Jamesian story remains somewhat inadequate. For it seems to 
require a one-to-one mapping between distinct emotional states and distinctive ‘brute-
physiological’ signatures, and it seems to suggest that whenever the physiological 
state is induced and detected, the same emotional feeling should arise. Neither of 
these implications (see Critchley, 2005) has been borne out by observation and 
experiment. The basic story can, however, be refined and extended by adding a  
‘predictive twist’. Thus Seth (2013) suggests that a neglected core component may be 
the match (or mismatch) between a cascading series of top-down predictions of our 
 
 
own interoceptive states, and the forward-flowing information contained in sensory 
prediction error. Our interoceptive predictions, this story suggests: 
 
 arise from multiple hierarchical levels, with  higher levels integrating 
interoceptive, proprioceptive, and exteroceptive cues in formulating 
descending predictions. (Seth (2013) p.567.) 
 
A single inferential process here integrates all these sources of information, 
generating a context-reflecting amalgam that is experienced as emotion. Felt emotions 
thus integrate basic information (e.g. about bodily arousal) with higher-level 
predictions of probable causes and preparations for possible actions. In this way: 
 
The close interplay between interoceptive and exteroceptive inference implies 
that emotional responses are inevitably shaped by cognitive and exteroceptive 
context, and that perceptual scenes that evoke interoceptive predictions will 
always be affectively coloured. (Seth (2013) p. 563) 
 
Physiologically, the Anterior Insular Cortex is remarkably well-positioned to 
play a major role in such a process by encoding what Craig (2003, p. 500) describes 
as ‘a meta-representation of the primary interoceptive activity’. Emotion and 
subjective feeling states arise, this story suggests, as the result of multilevel inferences 
that combine sensory (interoceptive, proprioceptive, and exteroceptive) signals with 
top-down predictions to generate a sense of how things are for us and of what we 
might be about to do. Such a sense of ‘action-ready being’ encompasses our 
background physiological condition, estimations of current potentials for action, and 
 
 
the perceived state of the wider world. This delivers a grip upon both the nature and 
the significance our own embodied state.  
Importantly, such a grip must integrate basic information (e.g. about bodily 
arousal) with higher-level predictions of probable causes. This provides a very natural 
way of accommodating large bodies of experimental results showing that the 
character of our emotional experience depends both on the interoception of brute 
bodily signals and higher-level ‘cognitive appraisals’ (see Schacter and Singer (1962), 
Prinz (2004)). An example of a brute bodily signal is generic arousal as induced by – 
to take the classic example from Schacter and Singer – an injection of adrenaline. 
Such brute signals combine with contextually-induced ‘cognitive appraisals’ leading 
us to interpret the very same bodily ‘evidence’ as either elation, anger, or lust 
according to our framing expectations.  
 
 
2. Emotions as “constructs” (models) 
 
The account of emotion just sketched fits perfectly with the theory of 
constructed emotion (Barrett, 2017). This mechanises Barrett’s preceding conceptual 
act theory (Barrett, 2014) within a PP framework. The central claim is that in each 
waking moment the brain is integrating past experience to generate concepts to guide 
actions and give meaning to sensations. When the generated concepts involved relate 
to physiological imperatives, your brain constructs instances of emotion. 
Following from the accounts of emotion in the PP literature, each instance of 
an emotion arises as a categorisation of bodily signals, according to context, in terms 




When past experiences of emotion (e.g. happiness) are used to categorize the 
predicted sensory array and guide action, then one experiences or perceives 
that emotion (happiness). (Barrett, 2017, p.9)  
 
The theory of constructed emotion makes a sharp distinction between emotion 
instances, and emotion categories. An emotion instance is the in-the-moment 
construction of an emotion given the current context. What we usually describe as an 
emotion, (e.g. fear) is better described as an emotion ‘category’, which unifies diverse 
and highly variable instances under a single classificatory umbrella (Clark-Polner, 
Johnson & Barrett, 2016). Emotion categories, Barrett argues, do not exist in nature – 
they are assigned according to functional and socially constructed roles. Motivation 
for this view comes from what has been dubbed the “emotion paradox” (Barrett, 
2006). The emotion paradox refers to the fact that while the existence of emotions 
such as “sadness”, “anger”, “happiness” is assumed by the scientific community and 
supported by common sense, the empirical literature calls into question this 
assumption due to the absence of any signature – be it a facial expression, 
physiological response or neural activity - that reliably indexes any emotion category. 
This leads to Barrett’s claim that emotion categories are collections of diverse 
instances that are clumped together in terms of their functional role, lacking dedicated 
facial expressions, physiological responses or neural signatures, Barrett states: 
 
Emotion categories are as real as any other conceptual categories that require a 
human perceiver for existence, such as ‘money’ (i.e. the various objects that 
 
 
have served as currency throughout human history share no physical 
similarities). (Barrett, 2017, p.13). 
 
This many-to-one mapping of physical states to emotion categories - called 
‘degeneracy’ - is the primary argument behind the lack of any kind of emotional 
“essence”. Degeneracy is borne out by the empirical literature. A meta-analysis of 
facial expressions indicates that many different facial expressions can be observed for 
the same category, and many different emotional categories can be understood by the 
same facial expression (Duran et al, 2017) – the meaning of a facial expression 
largely depends on context. Physiological signatures for any emotion category have 
proved to be similarly elusive, with a recent meta-analysis (Siegel et al, 2018) 
showing that there are no physiological signatures that reliably correspond to any one 
emotion category – for instance, when you’re angry, your blood pressure can go up, 
down, or remain the same. On Barrett’s view the determining factor is what kind of 
action the brain is preparing the body for – getting ready to fight requires recruitment 
of different resources than some other anger-related course of action, despite the 
emotion categorisation (‘anger’) being the same (Barrett, 2017). Similarly, a meta-
analysis on the neurophysiological basis of emotion categories are not contained 
within any one brain region or system, but are represented as configurations across 
multiple brain networks (Wager et al, 2015).  
From the perspective of evolution, degeneracy in the brain makes sense as an 
adaptive engineering principle. A key result of degeneracy is that a single brain can 
create a vast number of spatiotemporal patterns. These high complexity systems are 
preferred by natural selection as they can as they can reconfigure themselves into a 
multitude of different states (Whitacre, 2010; Whitacre and Bender, 2010). This 
 
 
reconfiguration ability is what makes our brains, on this account, radically flexible 
according to culture and environment.  
Emotions, then, are not reactions to the world, not even interoceptively 
informed reactions to the world. Rather, they are out-and-out constructions of the 
world. Emotions are constructed in just the same way that percepts are constructed; 
that is, they are predictive models of the likely causes of the sensory input, made by 
re-stitching together past experiences and then classifying the current experience as an 
amalgam of past experiences of a similar nature. These emotional predictions are 
made always in the service of regulating the body’s internal milieu, that is, in the 
service of allostasis (Barrett and Simmons, 2015; Barrett, 2017) Predictive 
processing, Barrett suggests, provides the mechanism underlying these 
categorisations.  
On this more ‘action-oriented’ predictive processing account, the top-down 
flow of predictions anticipate 1) upcoming interoceptive and exteroceptive signals 
and 2) the best action or bodily response to deal with the upcoming sensory flow. In 
order to create these ‘concepts’ (embodied, whole-brain representations), the brain 
creates predictions by using past experience to answer “What is this new sensory 
input most similar to?” (Barrett, 2017). The incoming sensory evidence, in the form 
of prediction error, helps to select and shape the distributions of predictions that are 
activated that best fit the sensory array, thereby minimising prediction error – 
resulting in a categorisation of the incoming sensory information in terms of past 
experiences (Barrett, 2006). That means that the predictions activated in the present 
are an instance of what Barsalou refers to as ‘ad hoc’ concepts (Barsalou, 1983). In 
the brain, a concept looks like a distributed pattern of activity across populations. 
These ad hoc concepts or predictions, that categorize present sensory flux in terms of 
 
 
past experience, are the mechanism of construction of any given instance of emotion. 
This predictive cascade – the interpretation of the sensory flux in terms of its expected 
utility to allostasis - is the process of meaning-making in the brain.  
Notice also that emotion and cognition are here performed in exactly the same 
way, that is, in reference to allostasis, and sensory inputs (prediction error) are used as 
information to guide the sculpting of concepts that engender adaptive action. This 
process is an approximation of Bayesian inference (Deneve, 2008) to decide amongst 
which simulation (interlocked web of predictions) should be implemented in order to 
maximise allostatic efficiency across multiple body systems (e.g. need for glucose, 
oxygen, salt etc.), and activate appropriate metabolic expenditure in the service of 
action (tiger, run!).  
Barrett’s theory is supplemented with a compelling neurobiological 
implementation story, where the default mode network represents efficient, 
multimodal summaries, which, when activated, cascade through the entire cortical 
sheet, terminating in primary sensory and motor regions. The cascade as a whole is an 
instance of a concept, or an emotion (Barrett, 2017). That said, the link between the 
neurobiology and the conceptual argument is not altogether clear: the empirical 
evidence is open to interpretation and amenable to other conceptual theories of 
emotion (including other conceptual theories with PP as the underlying mechanism). 
The theory of constructed emotion offers a plausible account of how diverse 
instances of emotion come to be placed together under unifying conceptual umbrellas. 
It also fleshes out how emotion categories are cleaved apart according to context, and 
how the categories are more socially determined conceptual categories than categories 
existing in nature. Furthermore, the theory partially fleshes out the conception of 
emotion as interoceptive inference, both with a more specific mechanism of diverse 
 
 
instances of emotion, and in setting out how different emotion categories come to be 
formed.  
 
3. From Embodied Emotion to Embodied Valence 
 
So how do we make sense of affective value or valence? What determines the 
evaluative dimension of an emotion instance?  Here is an initial approach we might 
take to accounting for valence in terms of the properties of an action-oriented 
predictive processing system. 
The core imperative of a predictive processor is the successful prediction of 
incoming sensory evidence. Thus it may initially seem that the successful 
minimisation of prediction error should be what determines an overall state of 
positive valence. Though this may seem promising at first, such a proposal quickly 
falls apart. Any account of valence that is state-based, that equates positive valence to 
a state of minimized prediction error, fails to do justice to the fact that prediction error 
minimisation is necessarily a dynamic and continuous process, constantly engaging 
action, and designed to account for the on-going maintenance of an organism in an 
ever changing world. Only from this perspective can we avoid the ‘dark room’ 
objection to predictive processing (Friston, Thornton, and Clark, 2012). This states 
that if my goal is solely the minimisation of prediction error, then surely I should just 
seek out a dark, empty room and stay there. Perfect prediction, it seems, is attainable 
by avoiding action and practicing sensory (and nutritional) deprivation until death. 




An initial response to this might be that the various demands of survival (as 
ultimately signalled in the form of prediction error) would move you onwards. But 
note that even were your dark room to come equipped with a life support machine 
(consider an unending night in an abandoned hospital ward) it is unlikely that you 
would find this to be an endlessly pleasurable experience. Humans not only find a 
lack of novel stimulation boring, they actively seek out and take delight in a rich 
repertoire of aesthetic, humorous, or thrilling situations, from skydiving to stand-up, 
that are specifically engineered to generate a rush of prediction error through the 
violation of prior expectations.  
A more promising strategy is as follows. Instead of tying valence to the 
achievement of some particular error-minimized state, Joffily and Coricelli (2013) 
propose a dynamic alternative in which valence is taken to be the rate at which this 
error is being reduced. In mathematical terms valence is recast as the first time-
derivative of error: a matter of velocity, rather than position. We seek out surprising 
states, then, in as much as they offer us the opportunity to engage in a faster (rather 
than slower) rate of reduction in prediction error. Drawing on Carver and Scheier’s 
(1990) control theoretic account of emotion, Van De Cruys (2017) improves and 
extends this story by suggesting that, rather than being straightforwardly a matter of a 
positive rate of error reduction, pleasure (positive valence) occurs when our actual 
rate of error reduction is higher than we had predicted it would be. If it is lower, we 
experience negative valence.  
An upshot of explaining valence in terms of these processing characteristics, 
rather than specific content, is that it is no longer tied to any particular set of causes, 
error modality, or level of inference. We can thus describe a relationship between 
allostasis and valence that is not constrained (as it is in Seth (2013)) to inference over 
 
 
the causes of interoceptive signals alone. This seems like the correct route to take. 
Homeostatic maintenance is served not only by the direct monitoring and regulation 
of physiological variables, but also indirectly, by the anticipatory regulation of our 
external environment. Whether intero or extero-ceptive, persistent unreduced 
prediction error is a sign that we do not have a grip on our self or surroundings, and 
adjustments need to be made.  
Furthermore, tying valence to the regulation of exteroceptive error reduction 
rate allows us to characterise more ‘cognitive’ experiences of positive valence – those 
that are not easily described in terms of basic physiological reactions - such as 
responses to art, narrative or humour. These can now be understood as achieving their 
emotional effects by engineering pleasurable trajectories in the creation and violation 
of expectations, followed by the subsequent pleasurable release in the eventual 
reduction of resulting prediction error. This fits nicely with descriptions of humour, as 
resulting from the creation and resolution of tension (Sroufe and Waters, 1976) and, 
as Van De Cruys and Wagemans (2011) suggest, provides a potential explanation of 
the failure of aesthetic principles (such as harmony, fluency, or balance) to account 
for the success of celebrated works of art which regularly display the deliberate 
violation of such rules.  
 
4. Emotion and Cognition 
 
Summing up the previous sections, what predictive processing reveals is a 
world permeated by affect – a world of opportunities for action, geared to current 
tasks, modulated by information about our own bodily states. But to see just how 
radical the PP picture turns out to be, we still need to add one final ingredient. It’s that 
 
 
PP rejects the picture of emotion and cognition as fundamentally different kinds - at 
least insofar as they are causally active parts of the cognitive machinery.   
According to a popular view, often associated with Hume, a fundamental 
divide among all things mental is one that divides the informational and the 
motivational. The former is about the organism (“coldly”) coming to a view about 
what’s going on in the world, whereas the latter is about (“hotly”) driving the 
organism to bring about change in the world. Hume’s central point was that without 
the latter, without passions, no action would ever take place. A hypothetical creature 
only capable of having informational states would stay still, inert and unmoved to do 
anything, regardless of what it learnt about the world. In this sense, according to 
Hume, emotion (affect, passion) broadly construed, is the driving force behind all 
action, but completely distinct from belief (and insulated from “reason”). 
The idea that informational states on the one hand, and motivational states on 
the other, are fundamentally different kinds of state whose interaction is required to 
bring about action, is widely embraced in daily life. It forms not only a core part of 
common-sense (or ‘folk’) psychology, but is deeply embedded in some more 
scientific frameworks too. Statistical decision-theory (including neuroeconomics and 
work on reinforcement learning) inherits this Humean picture, since in standard 
realizations it works with a firm separation between encodings of value or ‘utility’ 
and encodings of probability. In these frameworks, decisions are made and actions 
selected only when utility and probability align, revealing viable opportunities for 
worldly interventions that deliver weighted rewards at calculated costs (for a useful 
review, see Sanfey et al (2006)). 
By contrast, PP posits only predictions, informed by multiple inner and outer 
sources of information. In PP motivational states are realized as predictions about our 
 
 
own future actions and states. To see how, let’s return to the PP treatment of action. 
Action is making the world conform to some of your predictions, and is just another 
way of reducing long-term prediction error. At the bottom level, PP makes sensori-
muscular (proprioceptive) prediction into a proxy for motor commands (Shipp, 
Adams and Friston (2013)). Predicting the flow of sensori-muscular effects that 
would occur if you hit the tennis ball just right actually brings the ‘good hitting’ 
about. In a little more detail, the brain predicts the flow of states of muscle spindles, 
tendons, and joints that the action demands, and the resulting errors (since those states 
are not yet actual) are systematically quashed by moving the body so as to make that 
flow of prediction come true. This is an elegant and economical means of delivering 
basic motor control (see e.g. Shipp et al. (2013)). 
PP deploys the same kind of story ‘all the way up’. Our action-guiding 
proprioceptive predictions are themselves caused by even higher-level and longer 
time-scale predictions – predictions about our own future behaviors and future states. 
These entrain actions when good opportunities arise (see Pezzulo, Rigoli and Friston 
(2015)). The picture is of nested beliefs that entrain actions by bringing about 
predicted sensory flows. For example, suppose I believe/predict that I will meet you at 
7:00 at the movie-theatre. This (combined with prior knowledge and any newly 
gleaned information) leads me to believe/predict that I will get the 6:30 bus. That last 
prediction then acts as a kind of mini-policy that enslaves motor action (by means of 
proprioceptive predictions) when it is time to leave the house.  
Simple action-entraining motor intentions here cash out as precise 
proprioceptive predictions, while higher-level intentions, including standing goals, are 
realized by higher-level predictions of whole swathes of sensory information, which 
likewise entrain actions (by yielding precise proprioceptive predictions) when they 
 
 
themselves are assigned high enough precision.  These nested, interacting predictions 
arise and dissolve – in ways that realize the phenomenological flux of shifting drives 
and desires - as we move around the world, acting and harvesting new sensory 
information. If PP is on track, the causally potent play of human motivation is not an 
illusion - but it is realized using only the common currency of multi-level, multi-area 
prediction. In this picture, prior beliefs (resulting in predictions) combine with 
sensory evidence to bring about action. This is just the bedrock (Bayesian) move – 
one that turns everything into a form of prediction-based inference.  
It has been suggested (Holton (2016), Klein (2016)) that this picture is too 
impoverished to be a satisfying story about human minds. Part of their reasoning is 
roughly Humean. The Humean worry is that beliefs (or predictions) without 
motivations are inert, unable to mandate actions. That’s already taken care of by the 
PP story though, since high-precision predictions that have proprioceptive (hence 
motoric) consequences are immediately poised to entrain actions to make themselves 
come true. Holton also worries that assimilating desires to predictions “doesn't do 
justice to the multiplicity and malleability of human desire” noting that we need to 
accommodate cases where we desire X and may even do X while believing that X 
won’t bring us happiness or pleasure. However, PP accommodates this very simply, 
by separating predictions about the hedonic consequences of actions from the full set 
of predictions that interactively entrain actions. Specifically, the predictive processing 
story firmly distinguishes (Friston, Shiner et al. (2012)) between sub-personal action-
entraining high-precision predictions concerning what I will do and predictions of the 
hedonic (interoceptive) outcomes of those very actions. PP thus accommodates the 
fact, highlighted by Holton, that drug users often do not believe/predict that taking the 
drugs will actually lead to happiness. But what they do predict is seeking and 
 
 
ingesting the drug. PP thus easily reconstructs the useful distinction between 
‘wanting’ and ‘liking’ (Berridge (2007)). The PP picture thus turns out to be a neat fit 
with important work on the nature and mechanisms of addiction (Berridge (2007), 
Friston et al (2012)). More generally, even given that the addict need not predict that 
the drugs will bring pleasure, PP remains poised to explore a wide variety of 
promising accounts in which the addict’s experiences and actions are the results of 
interacting sub-personal (non-conscious) predictions.  
This replaces Hume’s two interacting kinds (reason and passion) with a 
picture of large numbers of subtly different and modifiably interacting elements. All 
of those elements are somewhat belief-like (consisting in predictions) but somewhat 
desire-like too (as they help select and entrain actions at multiple time-scales). So, 
while it may look like a simplifying move, what PP finally delivers will in fact be a 
far richer palette for explaining human behaviour. That palette allows a full spectrum 
of possibilities that reach far beyond the simple, constrained interactions suggested by 
crude folk psychological distinctions between ‘cognition’ and ‘conation’.  
We have seen how this collapses belief and desire, and desire is often 
construed as a “hot” or “impassioned” state, but it is clearly a mistake to equate 
emotion with desire. As several theorists have noted (e.g. Marks 1982, Oakley 
1992), emotion has both belief-like and desire-like elements. Experiencing fear of the 
spider simultaneously tells you about the world (e.g. that there is a spider there), while 
also motivating you to act in a certain way (run away from said spider). But whereas 
the standard way of thinking of emotions is as composed of these belief and desire-
like elements, PP construed things very differently. Just because the belief and desire-
like elements can be “read off” the emotional state, it is not to say that 
psychologically (or indeed ontologically) they are somehow the primitive building 
 
 
blocks of a hybrid and less primitive state called emotion. On the contrary, according 
to PP, it is the emotional state, which simultaneously informs and moves, that is 
primitive, and, in predictive processing terms, this is all fleshed out in the common 
currency of predictions and predictive models: predictions generated by complex 
hierarchical models concerning, in an interconnected manner, the organism, the 
world, and the organism’s place in that world.  
The same point can be made in terms of direction of fit. Whereas it has been common 
to think of beliefs, with their mind-to-world (or descriptive) direction of fit, and 
desires, with their world-to-mind (or directive) direction of fit, as being the 
fundamental building blocks of the mind, what is actually fundamental in the PP 
architecture is prediction, which can vary across a spectrum as to the extent to which 
it should be fulfilled by the world (perception/belief) or the self (action/desire). This 
means that pure belief (or cold perception), or pure desire (or blind action), is actually 
idealization, a mere theoretical construct. What we are actually left with is a wide 
variety of what Millikan (1995) calls “pushmi-pullyu representations”, states that 
simultaneously describe and direct. 
 
 
 5. Concluding remarks 
 
Emotions, we have argued, are built from predictions. They reflect inner and 
outer sources of information, combined in flexible ways, and are answerable to the 
full world knowledge (generative model) of an agent. But they are not a special 
cognitive kind. Instead, they are part and parcel of an integrated processing system 
whose core functionality is to reduce precision-weighted prediction error by 
 
 
maintaining dynamic engagements with the world. These engagements display 
trajectories both marked and determined by valence, where positive valance reflects 
better-than-predicted slopes of error minimization. What emerges is a picture of mind 
as an action-oriented system all of whose states are somewhat belief-like, and 
somewhat desire-like too.  
Another way of looking at this is as follows. In so far as full-blown emotions 
as we typically understand them are the most prominent and consciously detectable 
(and hence categorized) of these action-oriented states, one could say that PP renders 
emotion, construed more broadly to include even the very subtlest of these, ever-
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